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We model the endogenous formation of nations in a world econ-
omy where nations apply redistributive policies. We show that
people’s preference for stronger redistributive policies may lead
to greater inequality in the world’s distribution of income as a
result of rich individuals tending to form their own nations. By
the same token, stable economic integration occurs only when
redistributive policies are not too strong.
1. Introduction
One of the main purposes of taxation is the redistribution of income, and
one of the rationales for redistribution is that it brings about a better
society in terms of income equality. Other things being equal ~namely,
disregarding other purposes and effects of taxation, such as providing
public goods and incentives!, a nonregressive income tax improves the
distribution of income in society. On the other hand, it is not clear how
far a society is willing to go in accepting a strong redistributive policy.
Most treatments of taxation consider a given society with a benevolent
government that tries to maximize a social welfare function; a few papers
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157apply game-theoretic models in which the government is responsive to
pressures exerted by the voters. An alternative game-theoretic approach,
whereby the formation of jurisdictions within society is endogenously deter-
mined, was introduced by Wooders ~1978!, Guesnerie and Oddou ~1981!,
and Greenberg and Weber ~1986!. There, however, the issue is the provi-
sion of a public good. In the present paper we adopt a similar approach,
but apply it to the analysis of income redistribution. Our primary purpose
is to investigate the effects of redistributive policies on the distribution of
income worldwide. A close predecessor is Bennett and Wooders ~1979!
where a similar approach is applied to the analysis of the effects of redis-
tributive policies to efficiency. Our solution concept incorporates the pos-
sibility of any group of individuals forming a separate nation with its own
proportional tax policy. Consequently, our approach takes into consider-
ation the fact that if the tax burden is too heavy, some individuals may
prefer to secede and form their own nation.
In order to focus on the redistributive role of taxation we adopt a
general equilibrium framework in which taxes are nondistortionary. Though
individuals differ in their endowments, they have the same preferences,
which are defined over their consumption bundles of private goods and
on a measure of income redistribution. We assume no cultural links or
historical background to unite people, and no form of atavism separates
individuals. Summarizing, we model a world in which all individuals are
identical except for their initial wealth.
The individuals’ concern about income redistribution is what we call
“welfare-state mindedness.” In the model, individuals do not want to live
in a society where the government does not provide a minimum level of
income. Once this minimum level is guaranteed by the government for all
individuals in society, agents care only for their own consumption. There-
fore, provided the required minimum level is guaranteed, the only reason
for an agent to join another nation or to emigrate from his own is an
improvement of his own material well-being. This kind of welfare-state
mindedness may seem too extreme but was neatly captured in a front-
page New York Times article on December 13, 1996, quoting a representa-
tive Norwegian who said: “We are a very social democratic society....I t
may be costly, but there is social peace. There are no poor people in
Norway and I don’t want to see any.”
We look for an international equilibrium, which is a stable partition of
the set of individuals into nations. By stable we mean that no group of
individuals would be better off by forming a new nation. In the equilib-
rium, not only is the partition of the world into nations endogenously
determined, but also each nation’s redistributive policy. It can be argued
that our equilibrium concept abstracts from political institutions that may
be relevant for the determination of the nation’s redistributive policy. Our
results indicate, however, that the precise modeling of these political
institutions is irrelevant, provided people have the ability to form their
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Alternatively one can say that the only institutions that will be observed in
equilibrium are those consistent with our endogenously determined redis-
tributive policy.
Unlike in models where the main role of taxation is to finance a
public good ~see, e.g., Westhoff 1977 and Greenberg and Weber 1986!,
our equilibria are typically constituted by nations of very different people.
It is not generally true that individuals with similar incomes cluster together.
Unlike most treatments of migration ~see, e.g., Myers 1990; Wildasin 1991;
Hercowitz and Pines 1991; and Cukierman, Hercowitz, and Pines 1994!,
where there is free mobility between jurisdictions within a nation, in our
model it may well be the case that an individual prefers, in equilibrium, a
nation other than his own. This desire to emigrate does not upset the
equilibrium because, in order to immigrate, an individuals needs the
consent of the absorbing country. Although the assumption of free mobil-
ity is certainly appropriate when one deals with jurisdictions within a
nation, it is extremely unrealistic when the mobility is across countries, as
anyone who has tried to migrate from one country to another can testify.
Another result relates to the issue of economic integration. In order
to achieve economic integration, individuals should not be excessively
welfare-state minded. It is shown that there is a level of welfare-state
mindedness whose corresponding redistributive policy guarantees eco-
nomic integration, which results not only in efficient production but also
yields a world distribution of income that Lorenz dominates any other
equilibrium income distribution achieved under a stronger policy. Fur-
ther, once beyond that critical level, the stronger the distributive policy,
the less equal the worldwide distribution of income. The intuition behind
this result is that too strong a redistributive policy may lead to a world with
many relatively egalitarian societies that nonetheless differ in their per
capita incomes, while a weaker policy would yield a world with less egal-
itarian nations but with similar average income levels. Matters become
aggravated when the incomes policy pursued is too vigorous, because the
division of the world into very different nations ~in terms of their capital-
labor ratio! carries an efficiency loss with it.
Our model assumes no capital mobility across nations. This assump-
tion is behind the fact that equilibrium nations may have heterogeneous
populations. When there is perfect capital mobility, many of our results
are strengthened. In particular, individuals’ preference for redistribution
have no effect on the final outcome. In fact, with perfect capital mobility
no income distribution takes place.
The paper is organized as follows: After presenting the basic defini-
tions related to national economies in Section 2, we discuss the central
solution concept of an international equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4
gives a characterization of international equilibria, showing also their exis-
tence and essential uniqueness. The relation between government inter-
Formation of Nations 159vention, income distribution, and integration of the world economy is
analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the related literature. Theorem
proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1 National Equilibrium
Let T 5 $1,2% be a set of two types, with the associated characteristics
~Ki,Li,Ui!, i 5 1,2. Here Ki and Li are the initial capital and labor
endowments of an individual of type i and Ui :R1
2 r R is his utility
function. We assume that K1 , K2 and that all individuals are endowed
with one unit of labor—that is, Li 5 1, i 5 1,2. The utility function of an
individual of type i depends on the amounts of the private good—say,
peanuts—and on the per capita level of public provision of peanuts in the
nation S y. These preferences are assumed to be of the form:
Ui~x, S y! 5 U~x, S y!5H
x S y ³ [ y
2` S y , [ y.
The welfare-state mindedness of the people is captured by the param-
eter [ y. People cannot tolerate living in a society where the government
does not guarantee a minimum level of peanuts. This may be because
people experience extreme disutility when they see the miserably poor
around them or because poverty carries the germ of negative externalities
such as crime. But once this minimum level of peanuts is supplied, indi-
viduals’ preferences are egoistic and well-behaved as in standard eco-
nomic models.
There is a publicly available technology, F :R1
2 r R1, that transforms
capital and labor inputs into peanuts. The production function F is assumed
to be concave, exhibits constant returns to scale, and satisfies limKr0]F0
]K~K,1! 5 `, limKr`]F0]K~K,1! 5 0, and, for all K . 0, ]F0]K~K,1! . 0
and ]
2F0]K
2~K,1! , 0. Given the constant returns to scale technology F,
we can define the per capita production function f ~k! 5 F~k,1!. We assume
throughout that f ~K1! . [ y—in other words, that it is feasible to guarantee
a level [ y even in a country populated only by type-1 individuals.
DEFINITION 1: An economy is a vector l :5 ~l1,l2! [ R1
T, l Þ 0.
Here l should be interpreted as the economy’s population pro-
file; that is, li is the measure of individuals of type i in the economy.
We denote by k~l! the capital-labor ratio of l; thus, k~l! 5
(i[TKili 0(i[Tli. Since we concentrate on Walrasian allocations, which
assign identical bundles to identical agents, we can confine ourselves to
the kind of allocations defined below.
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is a vector of bundles ~x1,x2! such that
(
i[T
xi li £ f @k~l!#(
i[T
li.
An allocation is a description of a consumption plan for each type in
the economy that is consistent with the resources of the economy.
Next we define a specific allocation for each economy which is asso-
ciated with a price equilibrium and in which peanuts are partially pro-
vided by the government. For this purpose we assume that a level S y ³ 0o f
peanuts is publicly provided to each individual in the economy and that it
is financed by means of proportional income taxation. Hence, the gov-
ernment sets an amount S y to be provided to each individual and a fixed
income tax rate t. The notion defined below describes the equilibrium
outcome once the level S y is already determined. The level of public pro-
vision of peanuts, however, will be endogenously determined when we
consider the international equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3: A national equilibrium of an economy l relative to a public
provision S y ³ 0 is a system ^r,w,t,~xi!i[T& such that
1. ~xi!i[T is an allocation
2. for all i [ T with li . 0, xi solves the problem
max U~x, S y! s.t. 0 £ x £ ~12t!@w1rKi#1 S y
3. r 5 f
'@k~l!# and w 5 f @k~l!# 2 f
'@k~l!#k~l!
4. t(i[T~w 1 rKi!li 5 S y(i[T li.
The first condition is a feasibility requirement. The second condition
says that each individual maximizes his utility given the tax rate, the level
of public provision of peanuts set by the government, and his income.
Condition 3 is the usual factors market clearing conditions. The last one
is a balanced budget condition for the government: the tax rate is chosen
so as to finance the public provision of peanuts exactly.
The interpretation is as follows: r and w are the market prices ~in
peanuts terms! of capital and labor, respectively. Given these prices, indi-
viduals choose the level xi of consumption of peanuts.
If [ y £ S y, there is a unique national equilibrium relative to S y, charac-
terized by
r 5 f '@k~l!#
w 5f @k~l!#2f '@k~l!#k~l!
xi 5@12 S y0f~k~l!!#@ f ~k~l!!2f '~k~l!!~k~l!2Ki!# 1 Sy
t 5 Sy0f ~k~l!!.
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ductivity of the total endowments in the economy. The individual’s gross
income in peanuts terms is f ~k~l!! 2 f
'~k~l!!~k~l! 2 Ki!, which is taxed
at a rate of S y0f ~k~l!!. Each agent then uses his net income to buy peanuts
in addition to that provided by the government.
Note that the total production of peanuts is independent of the level
S y of public provision. This means that the tax is not distortionary. This
follows from the fact that all factors of production are inelastically supplied.
If 0 £ S y , [ y then everybody’s utility is 2` independently of the
allocation; consequently all allocations are equilibrium allocations.
The level S y of publicly provided peanuts measures the degree of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy. The higher the level of publicly
provided peanuts, the higher the equilibrium tax rate and the larger the
magnitude of income redistribution. In other words, within the economy,
the higher S y, the more equal the distribution of income according to any
index that satisfies Dalton’s principle of transfers.
If ^r,w,t,~xi!i[T& is a national equilibrium relative to S y, then ~xi!i[T is
the corresponding national equilibrium allocation. Associated with a given
national equilibrium allocation, there is a national equilibrium utility
profile. In a national equilibrium, the utility of an individual of type i
depends only on his own initial endowment, on the capital-labor ratio of
the economy, and on the level S y of government intervention. We can
define the equilibrium utility function as follows:
V~k;Ki; S y! 5H
@12 S y0f ~k!#@ f ~k! 2 f '~k!~k2Ki!# 1 Sy [ y £ Sy £ f ~k!
2` Sy , [ y.
The value V~k;Ki; S y! is the utility level enjoyed by an individual with
initial endowment Ki, in an economy with a capital-labor ratio of k in a
national equilibrium with respect to S y.
Remark 1: In a national equilibrium, the individual’s utility depends on
his own capital endowment and on the following two parameters: ~i!
the capital-labor ratio of the economy and ~ii! the level S y of govern-
ment intervention. In particular, it does not depend on the population
measure of the economy. Therefore, for utility calculation purposes,
an economy in national equilibrium is completely characterized by its
average capital endowment and the public provision of peanuts.
We shall call a pair ~l, S y! a constituted nation, meaning an economy l
that is in a national equilibrium with respect to S y. The difference between
an economy and a constituted nation is that the former is just a group of
individuals while the latter is an organized economy with a redistributive
policy. Since the individual’s utility in a constituted nation is fully char-
acterized by k~l! and S y, we can draw both types of individuals’ indiffer-
ence curves as shown in Figure 1.
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ratio between K1 and K2. Further note that the redistributive policies
available to an economy l are characterized by S y £ f ~k~l!!. It can be
checked that, when S y . [ y,at y p ei ’s marginal rate of substitution of the










S y~12 S y0f~k!!f ''~k!
f '~k!
. ~1!
Consequently, for type-1 individuals the slope of the indifference curve at
each constituted nation is negative. Moreover the slope of the indiffer-
ence curve of the rich is higher than that of the poor when evaluated at
the same constituted nation.
2.2 Analysis of the Function V
We investigate the properties of the function V. The basic features of this
function are summarized in Figure 2.
Given a tax rate t, an increase in the public provision of peanuts
increases the utility of an individual of type i. On the other hand, the
more peanuts that are publicly provided, the higher the equilibrium tax
rate, which in turn lowers the after-tax income. As can easily be verified,
Figure 1: The space of constituted nations.
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lower or higher than the economy’s capital-labor ratio. If k ³ Ki, the
higher the public provision of peanuts, the higher his equilibrium utility;
and vice versa, if his capital endowment is higher than the economy’s
capital-labor ratio, the higher S y the lower his equilibrium utility.
Second, V is clearly increasing in the own capital endowment, since it
affects gross income positively without influencing the tax rate. Finally, a
change in the economy’s capital-labor ratio brings about two effects. On
the one hand, an increase in the capital-labor ratio reduces the equilib-
rium price of capital, thereby increasing the gross income of those with a
relatively low capital endowment and decreasing gross income of those
with high capital endowment. On the other hand, the same increase in
the average capital endowment reduces the equilibrium tax rate, which
increases the net income for any given level of gross income. Therefore,
an increase in k strictly increases the utility of those with lower-than-
average capital-labor ratio but has an ambiguous effect on the utility of
those with relatively high capital endowment.
This ambiguous effect is the driving force behind the results of this
model. There are two forces in this model: one tends to unite people and
the other tends to divide them. Subsidizing peanuts for the poor out of
taxes paid by the rich is a force that can drive the rich to secede. The
benefits from trade that emerge when two different types trade tend to
unite them. The outcome of this tension between subsidization and ben-
efit from trade is the main topic of this paper.
Figure 2: Properties of the function V.
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Up to this point we have described the equilibrium in a given economy
with a given level of public provision of peanuts. In this section we present
and analyze the notion of international equilibrium, in which different
national economies are endogenously formed. The level of public provi-
sion of peanuts in each of these national economies is also endogenously
determined in the international equilibrium. Under our international
equilibrium notion, nations are allowed to form provided they abide by
the constraint that their public provision of peanuts is financed by means
of a proportional income tax. An international equilibrium consists of an
endogenously formed partition of the world economy into several consti-
tuted nations, each having a government that provides peanuts and finances
it via proportional income tax. Moreover, no group of individuals can
benefit from establishing a new constituted nation.
Let T be the set of types as defined in Section 2. An economy m [ R1
T
is said to be a world economy if mi . 0 for all i [ T. That is, both types of
individuals are present in the world economy.
Our equilibrium notion requires from a partition of the world econ-
omy that it not be improved upon by any potential nation:
DEFINITION 4: An international equilibrium of the world economy m is a finite





~i! m 5 (j51
n lj;
~ii! there is no constituted nation ~s,y
'! such that for all i [ T with
si . 0 there is a nation l
j with li





Condition ~i! says that the inhabitants of all the constituted nations
add up to the inhabitants of the world. Condition ~ii! says that no group
of individuals can improve upon the existing partition of the world by
forming their own constituted nation. It is implicitly assumed in this
condition that no capital mobility between constituted nations is allowed.
Each constituted nation, existing or potential, must consume an amount
of peanuts that can be produced with its residents’ resources. The case of
perfect capital mobility is briefly analyzed in Section 4.3.
In order to improve upon a given partition of the world economy it
must be possible to form a new constituted nation by picking individuals
from the partition nations in such a way that all the individuals in the new
nation are better off.
According to this definition, a partition of the world economy into
nations is in equilibrium if it is immune to unions of existing nations,
secessions of regions from existing countries, or unions of regions of
different nations.
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not depend on the population measure of his country we can split up
any equilibrium nation into several nations with the same capital-
labor ratio and still remain in equilibrium, and vice versa. Therefore,
any equilibrium partition is equivalent to another equilibrium parti-
tion in which all the nations with the same average capital endowment
in the first equilibrium constitute a single nation in the second
equilibrium.
4. Characterization of the International Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the set of international equilibria and show
their existence under a mild assumption which guarantees that for each
world economy the international equilibrium is essentially unique. We
also give an informal description of the equilibria.
The lemma below and its corollary show that in the analysis of the
international equilibria it is sufficient to restrict attention to constituted
nations with S y 5 [ y.
LEMMA 1. Let ~l, S y! be a constituted nation with l . . 0 and S y . [ y. There is
an economy s such that for all i [ T with si . 0, V~k~s!,Ki, [ y! . V~k~l!,Ki, S y!.
Proof: Consider a nation l with a positive measure of individuals of both
types where the public provision of peanuts is given by S y . [ y.I t
follows from the difference in the marginal rates of substitution of the
two types of individuals ~Equation ~1!! that there is a combination
~k,y! of capital-labor ratio and public provision of peanuts to the
southeast of ~k~l!, S y! that increases the indirect utility of both types
~see Figure 1!. Since this is true for any interior point of the space of
constituted nations, there must exist a path from the initial ~k~l!, S y! to
the boundary of the box. If the path reaches [ y, we are done. If it hits
K2 then, since the boundary nation contains only rich type citizens,
we can continue the path down to [ y without changing the individuals’
utilities. n
Lemma 1 states that a mixed nation whose government provides more
than [ y peanuts per capita is not stable because a subgroup of individuals
can secede and form a new constituted nation that provides exactly [ y,
making all its citizens better off. The instability of a nation that provides
more than the equilibrium level cannot be remedied by setting up the
“appropriate” institution to determine the level of income distribution.
For example, a system where the level of S y is determined by majority
voting will lead to an unstable outcome unless the result is [ y. There will
always be pressure for secession if the chosen redistribution level ~deter-
mined by whatever mechanism! is not the equilibrium one.




m!& be an international equilibrium. Then
for all i 5 1,...,m, if l1
i . 0 and l2
i . 0 then S y
i 5 [ y. Otherwise, S y
i ³ [ y.
Proof: It is clear that no nation l
i in an international equilibrium can
have a public provision of peanuts lower than [ y since by increasing S y
i
to [ y the utility level of everybody increases. By the previous lemma, a
strictly mixed equilibrium nation cannot publicly provide more than [ y
peanuts per capita, as a subset of individuals in the nation can improve
upon that level. n
Corollary 1 says that in an international equilibrium, in all nations
that have a mixed population the government provides the same amount
of peanuts per capita, [ y. Nations with inhabitants of only one type may
provide more than [ y in equilibrium, but because actual transfers are null,
these equilibria are utility equivalent to those where the government
provides exactly [ y.
The above results are useful because they allow us to restrict attention
to nations that provide [ y peanuts per capita when we look for an inter-
national equilibrium. Corollary 1 tells us that the equilibrium nations
provide exactly [ y, and Lemma 1 tells us that in order to check whether a
given partition of the world into nations is an international equilibrium it
is enough to check for deviations where the deviating nations have [ y as
the redistributive policy. The reason is that if a nation can improve upon
a given partition using some S y as the redistributive policy instrument, then
Lemma 1 guarantees that there is another nation ~one that secedes from
the deviating one! that improves upon the same partition with [ y as the
redistributive instrument. Consequently, from now on we restrict atten-
tion to nations that provide the endogenously determined level S y 5 [ y of
peanuts per capita.
Let m be a world economy. The following sets are used in the defini-
tions below: For each D k [ @K1,K2# and S y ³ [ y let
X~ D k, S y! 5 $k [@ D k,K2#6V~k,K2, S y! ³ V~z,K2, S y!, "z [@ D k,K2#%.
The set X~ D k, S y! is the set of maximizers of the utility of type-2 individuals
in the interval @ D k,K2# given the redistributive policy S y. Since V is contin-
uous, X~ D k, S y! Þ B for all D k [ @K1,K2# and for all S y ³ [ y.
DEFINITION 5: Let m be a world economy. It is a well-behaved economy if for
all D k [ @K1,K2#, the set X~ D k, [ y! is a singleton or is $ D k,K2%.
This definition requires that the equilibrium utility of type-2 individ-
uals should have either one or two maximizers in the interval @ D k,K2#. But
in the latter case, the maximizers should be the extreme points of the
interval. Although we cannot guarantee that for all production functions
all economies are well-behaved, we could not find any counterexample.
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behaved world economy. Those who are interested only in the formal
description of the equilibrium can skip to the next subsection.
4.1 Informal Description of the Equilibria
For each world economy, all equilibria are equivalent in the sense that
they induce the same distribution of consumption plans. Moreover, for
any capital-labor ratio k, the measure of individuals living in a nation
whose capital-labor ratio is k is the same for all equilibria. They can differ
only in the number, and therefore size, of nations with a capital-labor
ratio k.
The economies can be divided into four cases:
Case 1: A nation populated only by type-2 individuals is preferred by
the rich to any other possible nation: K2 [ X~K1, [ y!.
Case 2: A nation populated only by type-2 individuals is preferred by
the rich to any nation with more than the world capital-labor
ratio but there are poorer nations that are preferred: K2 Ó
X~K1, [ y! and $K2% 5 X~k~m!, [ y!.
Case 3: A nation with the world capital-labor ratio is preferred by the
rich to any nation with more than the world capital-labor
ratio: K2 Ó X~K1, [ y! and k~m! [ X~k~m!, [ y!.
Case 4: The nation most preferred by the rich has a capital-labor ratio
strictly between the world capital-labor ratio and K2: K2 Ó
X~K1, [ y! and $k~m!,K2% ù X~k~m!, [ y! 5 B.
The four cases are illustrated in Figure 3. In Case 1 there are no
mixed nations in equilibrium. Note that any partition of the world econ-
omy that contains a mixed nation is improved upon by an economy that
consists of only type-2 individuals. In Case 2 all international equilibrium
partitions consist of two types of nations: a rich nation containing only
type-2 individuals and a poor nation with a mixed population and with a
capital-labor ratio that makes its type-2 inhabitants indifferent between
staying in their own nation and migrating to another existing nation. Note
that all type-1 individuals live in the poor nation~s! and would like to
migrate to a richer nation, but are prevented from doing so by the immi-
gration “services” of the rich nations. In Case 3, all international equilib-
ria consist of nations with the same capital-labor ratio ~the world’s capital-
labor ratio!. Unlike the previous one, in this case no one wants to migrate
to any existing nation. This fact, however, has nothing to do with our
equilibrium concept—rather, what makes this an equilibrium is that any
potential nation that type-1 individuals would like to live in needs some
type-2 individuals, but no type-2 individuals will agree to form such a
nation. ~Or similarly, any potential nation that type-2 individuals would
like to live in needs some type-1 individuals, but the latter will not agree





















9to cooperate in the formation of such a nation.! Note that in all three
cases, all the individuals of the same type have the same consumption
plan.
In the last case all the international equilibrium partitions consist of
two types of nations: a poor nation containing only type-1 individuals and
a richer nation with a mixed population and with the optimal capital-
labor ratio from the point of view of type-2 individuals. Note that in this
type of equilibrium all type-2 individuals have the same utility level. This
is not the case, however, for type-1 individuals. Those who live in richer
countries enjoy a higher utility level than those living in poorer ones.
Note that Cases 2, 3, and 4 may correspond to three world economies that
differ only in the proportions of type-1 and type-2 individuals, and con-
sequently in their respective capital-labor ratios. In Case 2 there is a high
proportion of type-2 individuals, in Case 3 this proportion is lower, and in
Case 4 this proportion is the lowest. Correspondingly, a type-2 individual’s
equilibrium utility improves from Case 2 to Case 3 and from Case 3 to
Case 4. This follows from the fact that in Cases 2 and 3, the competition
among type-2 individuals prevents them from getting the optimal utility
level.
4.2 Formal Characterization
Let Z k 5 max X~K1, [ y!; that is, Z k is the highest capital-labor ratio among
those that maximize the equilibrium utility of type-2 individuals in @K1,K2#.
~The continuity of V implies that Z k is well-defined.!
Define
B 5 X~k~m!, [ y!~ 2 !
and let V
* 5 V~k,K2, [ y! for some k [ B. V
* is the maximum utility level
that type-2 individuals can get in a nation characterized by a capital-labor
ratio between k~m! and K2. Let
C 5H
$K1% if Z k ³ k~m!
$k[@ Z k,k~m!#:V~k,K2, [ y!5V *, and k [X~k, [ y!% Z k , k~m!.
~3!
Since V~ Z k,K2, [ y! ³ V
* and V~k~m!,K2, [ y!£V
*, by the mean value theorem
C Þ B. The sets B and C will play an important role in the characteriza-
tion of the international equilibria. Theorem 1 below states that equilib-
rium nations have capital-labor ratios belonging to B or C. Nations that
are richer than the average will have a capital-labor ratio in B and poorer
than average nations will have a capital-labor ratio in C.
Remark 3: Since Corollary 1 says that all the equilibrium nations publicly
provide [ y peanuts, we shall denote a generic international equilibrium
by the partition of the world into economies, without writing the
distributive policies—that is, by E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m&. Moreover, when we
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that the economy can improve upon by applying the distributive pol-
icy [ y. Thus we take advantage of Lemma 1, which allows us to restrict
attention to this kind of improvements.
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this section.
THEOREM 1: Let m be a well-behaved world economy and let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be
a partition of m. E is an international equilibrium if and only if for all j 5
1,...,m, k~l
j! [ B ø C.
Theorem proofs are in the Appendix.
COROLLARY 2: Let E be an international equilibrium of the world economy m.
Then all type-2 individuals get the same utility level.
Proof: All equilibrium nations with some type-2 individuals in it have a
capital-labor ratio in B ø C, thus providing them with a utility level of
V
*. n
We now turn to the question of uniqueness of the equilibrium. Let
E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be an international equilibrium. Let k~E! 5 $k1,...,kn% be
the set of capital-labor ratios of the equilibrium nations. That is, kj [ k~E!
is the capital-labor ratio of some l
i [ E. For each kj [ k~E! define the
following economy:




j is the one that results from the integration of all the




n& be the partition of the world economy that
results from this process of integration. Call it the coarsest equilibrium par-
tition of m relative to E. Note that by Theorem 1 E
' is an equilibrium. We say
that m has an essentially unique equilibrium if all its equilibria have the
same coarsest partition of m.
THEOREM 2: Every well-behaved economy m has an essentially unique equilibrium.
4.3 The Case of Perfect Capital Mobility
The concept of international equilibrium we have worked with so far
assumes implicitly that capital is immobile. Namely, an individual’s capital
must be employed in the nation where he lives. In this subsection we
discuss the case where capital is perfectly mobile across nations.
Consider a situation where there is an international capital market in
which capital is exchanged for peanuts. As before, labor is internationally
immobile. Further assume that an individual pays ~capital and labor! income
tax only in the nation he belongs to. Since capital is perfectly mobile, in
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'@k~m!#, where m denotes the
world economy. Further, there will be price equalization in the national
labor markets, with a wage rate that corresponds to the world capital-labor
ratio. An international equilibrium with perfect capital mobility will be a
partition of the world economy into nations such that there is no group of
individuals that can benefit by forming its own nation which still partici-
pates in the international capital market.
Since equilibrium prices are independent of the partition of the world
into nations, it follows that there cannot be a nation that has a positive
measure of both type-1 and type-2 individuals. To see this, note that
type-2 individuals can improve upon a nation like this by seceding and
forming a nation of their own, thus avoiding the subsidization of the poor.
Consequently, the essentially unique equilibrium is a fully segregated world
consisting of one-type nations. The resulting allocation will be Pareto
optimal due to the perfect capital mobility. However, there will be no
effective income redistribution, no matter the level of welfare-state mind-
edness of the individuals. In fact, the equilibrium allocation will be iden-
tical to the one that results in a world with no welfare-state mindedness
and no capital mobility.
In the next section it is shown that without capital mobility a redis-
tribution of income occurs and its level depends on the degree of welfare-
state mindedness.
5. Welfare-State Mindedness, Integration,
and Income Distribution
In this section we make some comparative-statics analyses with respect to
the welfare-state mindedness, measured by the minimum level of peanuts
publicly provided that an individual can tolerate. It is clear that in a given
nation, the more peanuts are publicly provided, the more equal the result-
ing distribution of income. On the other hand a higher level of welfare-
state mindedness may change the composition of the equilibrium nations.
Therefore, it is not clear how a higher degree of welfare-state mindedness
affects the distribution of income in the world economy.
We first find a range of levels of welfare-state mindedness in which
the corresponding international equilibria yield only nations with the
same capital-labor ratio: k~m!. Namely, for different levels of welfare-state
mindedness within this range, the internal composition of the equilibrium
nations is the same. As a result, within this range an increase in the level
of welfare-state mindedness yields a worldwide decrease in income inequal-
ity. Outside this range, however, changes in the level of welfare-state
mindedness do change the internal composition of nations and their
capital-labor ratios, and consequently their effect on income distribution
is not obvious.
172 Journal of Public Economic TheoryThe following lemma states necessary and sufficient conditions for an
international equilibrium to yield the whole world as one nation as the
essentially unique equilibrium.
1
LEMMA 2: Let m be a world economy. Let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be an international
equilibrium. For all j 5 1,...,m, k~l
j! 5 k~m! if and only if
k~m![X~k~m!, [ y!. ~4!
Proof: Let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be an international equilibrium. Assume that
k~l
j! 5 k~m! for all j 5 1,...,m. Since the indirect utility function V
of type-1 individuals is strictly increasing in k within @K1,K2#, all
type-1 individuals would like to join a nation with a capital-labor ratio
larger than k~m!. Since E is an international equilibrium, it must be
that no type-2 individual wants to join such a nation. Thus, condition
~4! holds.
Assume now that condition ~4! holds. Therefore k~m![B and, by
Theorems 1 and 2, if l is an equilibrium nation it must be that k~l!5
k~m!. n
In terms of our informal description of the equilibria, Lemma 2 states
that the whole world as a nation is an equilibrium when the parameters of
the economy correspond to Case 3. Since our model makes no prediction
about the number and size of nations, all the equilibria that satisfy con-
dition ~4! are equivalent, in terms of the consumption plans, to the inter-
national equilibrium in which the whole world is one nation.
Let m be a world economy and let
A 5 $ [ y [@0, f ~k~m!!#:condition ~4! is satisfied%.
The set A is the range of levels of welfare-state mindedness that result in
equilibrium nations with the same proportions of type-1 and type-2 indi-
viduals. We are interested in the effect on worldwide income distribution
when the economies are outside this range.
Define ˘ y as the maximum element of A.
2 Welfare-state mindedness
levels above ˘ y are outside the range that results in the whole world as one
nation being essentially the unique equilibrium. Restricting attention to
levels above ˘ y, we would like to check how changes in the welfare-state
mindedness affect the worldwide distribution of income.
In order to answer this question, we need to compare world econo-
mies that differ only in the welfare-state mindedness of the individuals.
1Recall that, in accordance with Remark 3, we omit the [ ys from the equilibrium nations and
that by “improve upon” we mean improving upon applying the distributive policy [ y.
2A is clearly nonempty since, as can be easily verified, 0 [ A. Moreover, since A is a closed
subset of a bounded set, A is compact. Therefore, ˘ y is well defined.
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where [ y denotes the parameter of the utility function of the people in that
world.
Theorem 3 below states that in a large class of economies if the level
of welfare-state mindedness is outside A, namely if there are different
nations in equilibrium, an increase in the level of welfare-state minded-
ness results in an increase in worldwide income inequality and at the same
time no individual consumes more peanuts. This large class of economies
is given by the following definition.
DEFINITION 6: Let y
* ³ [ y be a level of public provision of peanuts. The world
economy m@ [ y# is U-shaped with respect to y
* if the function V~{,K2,y
*!
has no local maximum in the interval ~k~m!,K2!.
Given that V~k,K2,y
*! is increasing at k 5 K2, this assumption means
that V is either increasing or U-shaped in the interval ~k~m!,K2!. It can be
shown that if m@ [ y# is U-shaped with respect to y
*, V~k,K2, S y! has no local
maximum in ~k~m!,K2! for any S y [ @ [ y,y
*#.
We can now state the main theorem of this section.
THEOREM 3: Let I y ³ max A and let y
* . I y. Assume that m@y
*# and m@ I y# are
well-behaved, U-shaped economies with respect to y
* and I y, respectively. Choose an
international equilibrium of m@ I y# and denote it by D E. Assume further that there is
an equilibrium nation in D E with a positive measure of each type of individuals.
Similarly, denote by E
* an international equilibrium of m@y
*#. The world distri-
bution of income under D E is Lorenz superior to the world distribution of income
under E
*. Moreover, in D E all type-1 individuals consume more peanuts than in E
*
and all type-2 individuals consume no less.
In terms of our informal description of the equilibria, Theorem 3 tells
us that when we compare an equilibrium that corresponds to Case 2 to
one that corresponds to a higher level of welfare-state mindedness, the
equilibrium outcome of the former Lorenz and Pareto dominates the
equilibrium outcome of the latter.
This theorem says that the pursuit of a more vigorous redistributive
policy does not necessarily reduce worldwide inequality. Moreover, there
is an interval of parameter values of welfare-state mindedness such that
the equilibrium income distribution of the world is less equal the more
welfare-state minded the people are. The point is that any attempt to
redistribute more than what is implicit in the public provision of I y results
in some type-2 individuals fleeing from the poor nations to the rich
nations. This in turn results in an efficiency loss that is suffered only by
type-1 individuals.
If one wants the redistributive policy not to increase income inequal-
ity and not to damage the welfare of the poor, it is necessary that this
174 Journal of Public Economic Theorypolicy be within the set A. One can interpret this result to mean that a
necessary condition for a stable economic union among countries with
different wealth levels is that there should not be an overly strong redis-
tributive policy. The implication of this result to the future of the Euro-
pean Union is clear.
6. Related Literature
The related literature can be traced back to the seminal paper by Tiebout
~1956!. ~For a good appraisal of this work, see Kurz 1994!. Tiebout con-
jectured that in a local public goods economy there exist equilibria and all
of them are Pareto optimal. Two kinds of models have tried to formalize
Tiebout’s conjecture; they differ in the interpretation of the equilibrium
he had in mind.
The first interpretation is that of a Nash equilibrium. Here an equi-
librium is a partition of the agents into an exogenously fixed number of
jurisdictions such that no individual strictly prefers some other jurisdic-
tion to the one he belongs to. Each jurisdiction produces a local public
good that is financed by taxing its residents. The assumption of free
mobility between jurisdictions is implicit in the solution concept. Along
with this interpretation, Westhoff ~1977! gives sufficient conditions for
existence of equilibrium in an economy with an exogenously given num-
ber of jurisdictions. Bewley ~1981! gives several examples of economies
where this kind of Tiebout equilibrium either does not exist or is not
efficient. Benabou ~1993! applies this equilibrium concept to model the
population composition of different neighborhoods in a city. The analysis
of free mobility as a constraint to redistribution of income is the topic of
Epple and Romer ~1991!. Their model, however, takes the number of
jurisdictions within a federation as exogenously given. More recently, Bol-
ton and Roland ~1997! present a political economy analysis of secession in
a setup very similar to ours, but where two regions in a nation are exog-
enously given.
The second interpretation of Tiebout’s equilibrium identifies it with
the core. According to this interpretation, an endogenous partition of
the economy is an equilibrium if no group of individuals can make each
of its members better off by forming a new jurisdiction that provides the
local public good. Along with this second interpretation, early contribu-
tions include Wooders ~1978!, Bennett and Wooders ~1979!, Guesnerie
and Oddou ~1981!, and Greenberg and Weber ~1986!. Some recent con-
tributions include Conley and Wooders ~1997!, Cole and Prescott ~1997!,
and Ellickson et al. ~1999!. According to this view, migration tensions
may prevail in equilibrium. Namely, it may well be the case that some
group of individuals would prefer to migrate to an existing jurisdiction.
In this sense it is appropriate to call the equilibrium jurisdictions
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3 On the other hand, Greenberg and Weber showed that their
equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium or an equilibrium with free mo-
bility. Therefore, in their equilibrium there are no migration tensions.
Alesina and Spolaore ~1997! build a model similar to the one in Guesnerie
and Oddou and in Greenberg and Weber. The main difference lies in the
solution concept applied. The latter papers apply the core, but Alesina
and Spolaore apply a hybrid solution concept that mixes both interpreta-
tions of Tiebout’s equilibrium. In their model a coalition can improve
upon a partition of the economy only if it proposes another partition,
which is stable in a dynamic sense, in which nobody wants to migrate to a
neighboring country and which improves the welfare of some majority of
each of the deviating jurisdictions. Since their solution concept requires
that no individual should want to migrate to any existing jurisdiction,
migration tensions are absent by definition.
With the exceptions of Epple and Romer ~1991! and Bolton and
Roland ~1997!, our model differs from all the above in that it focuses on
the distributive role of taxation instead of on the provision of public
goods among agents with different preferences. We adopt the well-
established solution concept of the core. Contrary to Greenberg and Weber
~1986!, we get that in equilibrium there may exist migration tensions.
Moreover, when the equilibrium number of distinct nations is greater
than one, migration tensions do appear: poor individuals always want to
migrate to richer nations. Another important difference resides in the fact
that although in Westhoff ~1977! and in Greenberg and Weber, individu-
als with similar characteristics cluster together in equilibrium ~in Alesina
and Spolaore 1997 this feature is imposed rather than derived as an
equilibrium phenomenon!, in our model, as in Bennett and Wooders
~1979!, an equilibrium may consist of nations, some of which have several
types of individuals. The reason is that in the latter there are gains from
trade only when traders differ from each other.
Our paper is related and complements the macroeconomic litera-
ture on migration. In a static model of migration, Razin and Sadka
~1995! show that when a country’s individuals differ only in their cost of
becoming skilled laborers but not in their initial endowments, migration
constitutes a Pareto improvement. If the government applies a propor-
tional income tax, however, and redistributes revenues equally to the
entire population ~regardless of their national status!, migration is utility-
reducing for the native-born. This result coincides with our observation
that the use of taxation for redistributive purposes may cause incentives
to set barriers to migration. Our model formalizes the creation of such
barriers.
3One may say that if a core allocation can be supported by prices then, given these prices,
there are not migration tensions. But still, positive prices are a manifestation and a way to
deal with the migration tensions.
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The following lemma will be very useful in proving the theorems.
LEMMA 3: Let m 5 ~m1,m2! be an economy with average capital endowment
k~m!. Let t k and N k be two arbitrary numbers satisfying K1 £ t k , k~m! , N k £K2.
Then, there exists a unique partition of the economy m into two economies, l and
t, such that l 1 t 5 m and k~l! 5 t k, k~t! 5 N k.
Proof: In order to find the two economies we need to solve the following
system of linear equations, check that there is a unique solution, and





It can be shown that the solution to this system is as follows:
l1 5 ~m11m2!~K22 t k!~ N k2k~m!!0@~K2 2 K1!~ N k2 t k!#
l2 5 ~m11m2!~t k2K1!~ N k2k~m!!0@~K2 2 K1!~ N k2 t k!#
t1 5 ~m11m2!~K22 N k!~k~m!2 t k!0@~K2 2 K1!~ N k2 t k!#
t2 5 ~m11m2!~ N k2K1!~k~m!2 t k!0@~K2 2 K1!~ N k2 t k!#,
which is nonnegative. This completes the proof of the lemma. n
Lemma 3 implies that in an economy with a positive measure of
individuals of both types, it is always feasible to form a new economy by
choosing suitable proportions of individuals of each type, with an average
capital endowment equal to any number between K1 and K2.
Proof of Theorem 1:
LEMMA 4: Let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be a partition of m and assume that there
exists l
j [ E such that k~l
j! ³ k~m! and k~l
j! Ó B. Then E is not an
international equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4: Since k~l
j! ³ k~m!, there is a positive measure of
type-2 individuals in l
j. Assume there exists a nation l
i [ E with
k~l
i! , k~m!. Then, there is a positive measure of type-1 individ-
uals in l
i. Now, some suitable proportion of type-2 individuals of
l
j and of type-1 individuals of l
i can form a nation s with k~s![
B, thus improving upon E. If there is no nation l
i [ E with
k~l
i! , k~m!, it must be that k~l
j! 5 k~m!ÓB. But then there is
an economy s [ B that improves upon E. n
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1,...,l
m& be an international equilibrium and assume by
contradiction that there is l
j [ E such that k~l
j! Ó B ø C.B y
Lemma 4, k~l
j! , k~m!. Then there exists another nation l
i [ E with
k~l
i! . k~m!. Moreover, by Lemma 4, k~l
i! [ B.
Case 1: V~k~l
j!,K2, [ y! . V
*. In this case, some type-1 individuals of
l
j and some type-2 individuals of l
i can form a nation s with
k~s!5k~l
j!1e for e . 0 small enough, which improves upon E,
contradicting the assumption that E is an equilibrium.
Case 2: V~k~l
j!,K2, [ y! £ V
*.
Case 2.1: k~m! £ Z k. In this case it must be that V~ Z k,K2, [ y! 5 V
*.
Since k~l
j! Ó C, l
j is a mixed nation. Since m is a
well-behaved economy, V~k~l
j!,K2, [ y! , V
*. Therefore
some individuals of l
j can form a nation s with k~s! 5
Z k, thus improving upon E.
Case 2.2: k~m! . Z k. In this case V~ Z k,K2, [ y! . V
*. Then some
type-1 individuals of l
j with some type-2 individuals of
l
i can form a nation s with k~s! 5 Z k. This proves the
“if” part of the theorem.
Now let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be a partition of m with k~l
j![B ø C for
all j 51,...,m.I fk~m!£ Z k, all the type-2 individuals get the maximum
utility consistent with a national equilibrium with respect to [ y. Hence
there is no nation with type-2 individuals that improves upon E.
If k~m! . Z k, then a nation s with some positive measure of type-2
individuals improves upon E only if k~s! , k~l
j! for all l
j [ E. But no
type-1 individual wants to form such a nation. Since type-1 individuals
cannot improve upon any partition by themselves, E is an equilibrium. n
Proof of Theorem 2: We first show existence. By construction, C Þ B, B Þ
B, C # @K1,k~m!#, and B # @k~m!,K2#.I fk ~m! [ B ø C, by Theo-
rem 1, ^m& is an international equilibrium. Otherwise, by Lemma 3
there exists a partition of m into two nations, one in C and one in B,
which by Theorem 1 constitutes an equilibrium. To show essential
uniqueness, we need the following lemma.
LEMMA 5: B ø C is a nonempty set with at most two elements.
Proof of Lemma 5: First we show that C has exactly one element. It
follows directly by definition of C if Z k ³ k~m!.I f Z k,k~m!, assume
that there exist k1 and k2 in C, with k1 £ k2 ~recall that C Þ B!.B y
the definition of C, k2 [ X~k1, [ y!. But since m is a well-behaved
economy it must be that k1 5 k2. We know that B Þ B, and
since m is a well-behaved economy, B cannot have more than two
elements. If it has only one element we are done. If it has more
178 Journal of Public Economic Theorythan one, by the assumption that m is well behaved, k~m! is one of
them. But then k~m! [ C. n
Let m be a well-behaved world economy. By Lemma 5, B ø C is a
nonempty set with at most two elements. If B ø C is a singleton, it is
clear that the essentially unique equilibrium is ^m&. So let B ø C 5
$k1,k2% with k1 Þ k2. Let E 5 ^l
1,...,l
m& be an international equilib-






lj and s2 5 (
k~lj!5k2
lj.
By Theorem 1, E
' is an international equilibrium. E
' is the coarsest
partition of m relative to E. By Lemma 3, E
' is the unique partition
of m into two economies with capital-labor ratios k1 and k2 respec-
tively. Thus the coarsest partition of m relative to any international
equilibrium is independent of the equilibrium and equal to E
'. There-
fore m has an essentially unique equilibrium. n
Proof of Theorem 3: Since both world economies have the same distribu-
tion of endowments, their common capital-labor ratio is denoted by
k~m!. Consider the world economy m@y
*#. As in Section 4.2, define
k




*# is a well-
behaved and U-shaped economy, and since y




$K1% if k* ³ k~m!
$k[@k*,k~m!#:V~k,K2,y*!5V~K2,K2,y*!% if k* , k~m!.
In a similar way define B~ I y! and C~ I y!.
Note that since m@y
*# and m@ I y# are well-behaved and U-shaped,
C~y
*! and C~ I y! are singletons.
By Theorem 1, l
i [ E





i [ D E only if k~l
i! [ B~ I y! ø C~ I y!. Therefore, all type-2
individuals get the same utility level of V~K2,K2,y
*! 5 V~K2,K2, I y! at
any international equilibrium of m@y
*# or of m@ I y#. As a consequence,
• All type-2 individuals consume the same amount of peanuts at
the two equilibria considered.
Note too that, by Lemma 5, B~y
*! ø C~y
*! has at most two elements.










*!. Similarly, B~ I y! ø C~ I y! has exactly two
elements: B~ I y! ø C~ I y! 5 $ D k,K2%, where D k [ C~ I y!.
4 We claim that k
* ,
D k. To see this, note that by definition of C~ I y!, either V~ D k,K2, I y! 5
4Note that if I y 5 max A then D k 5 k~m!.
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rium nation with a positive measure of both types of individuals, D k .
K1. Therefore, V~ D k,K2, I y! 5 V~K2,K2, I y!. Since V is decreasing in the
policy argument, we have that V~ D k,K2,y
*! , V~K2,K2, I y!5V~K2,K2,y
*!.
Since m@y
*# is a U-shaped economy, V~k,K2,y
*! , V~K2,K2,y
*! for all
k [~ D k,K2!. Therefore we must have k
* , D k. Since the per capita produc-
tion function f is increasing and strictly concave, we have that
• Total production in the world economy m@y
*# is lower than
total production in the world economy m@ I y#.
Since K2 [ B~y
*!, by Theorems 2 and 1, all the type-1 individuals live
in nations with the same capital-labor ratio. As a result, the definition
of national equilibrium with respect to y
* implies that
• All type-1 individuals consume the same amount of peanuts at
all international equilibria of m@y
*#.
As for m@ I y#, an analogous reasoning shows that
• All type-1 individuals consume the same amount of peanuts at
all international equilibria of m@ I y#.
We have shown that in the equilibria of both world economies,
type-2 individuals consume the same amount of peanuts. Moreover,
within each world economy, all type-1 individuals have the same con-
sumption plans. Additionally, in m@ I y# total production is larger. Con-
sequently, all the additional production is distributed equally among
the type-1 individuals ~who are still poorer than type-2 individuals!.
This completes the proof of the theorem. n
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